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INTRODUCTION 
Francis Fukuyama in his new book, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of 
Resentment,1 argues that over the past decade the main axis of politics globally has shifted from a 
focus on economic issues to a focus on identity politics from issues of distribution to ones of 
recognition.2 He suggests that with this shift the world has seen the emergence of a new populist 
nationalism that threatens democracy around the world. It is this new nationalism, he posits, that is 
responsible, in part, for the election of Donald Trump in the United States and Brexit in the United 
Kingdom.3 
Fukuyama sees globalization as partially responsible for the rise in this nationalism, a form 
of identity politics. He argues that although identity politics grows out of the basic human need for 
recognition, its modern origins lie in part in the 1960s identity-based social movements against 
injustice. Fukuyama claims that the political Left subsequently adopted this form of politics, 
abandoning its historical aims of expanding economic wellbeing for large collectivities for larger 
groups of people than identity politics allows. The adoption of this politics, he contends, spurred 
the political Right into also adopting and engaging in a politics of identity, manifest in the current 
* Athena D. Mutua is a Professor of Law and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar at the University at Buffalo, 
School of Law, The State University of New York, email: admutua@buffalo.edu. I would like to thank Makau Mutua and 
Stephanie Phillips for their very helpful comments on this essay. 
1 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, IDENTITY: THE DEMAND FOR DIGNITY AND THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT (2018) [hereinafter 
IDENTITY]. 
2 Fukuyama never uses this phrase from distribution to recognition.  But he does contrast the two, noting 
that the [t]wentieth-century politics had been organized along a left-right spectrum defined by economic issues . . . [but] 
that spectrum appears to be giving way in many regions to one defined by identity.  Id. at 6. 
3 Brexit is short-hand for saying the United Kingdom is leaving the European Union, the term merges the 
words Britain  and Exit  to get Brexit. Juha Raitio & Helena Raulus, The UK EU referendum and the move towards 
Brexit, 24 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & COMP. L. 25, 25 (2017). 
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resurgence of nationalism, including white nationalism in the West what Europeans refer to as 
fascism.4 I disagree. 
Fukuyama summarizes this line of argument in a more strident, less nuanced piece entitled, 
Against Identity Politics: The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy.5 The piece appeared in 
the Foreign Affairs magazine in October 2018. In this essay I will refer to both the book and this 
piece. 
There is much in Fukuyama’s argument with which I agree. However, below, I argue his 
analysis is fundamentally flawed in that he incorrectly lays the blame for the rise of identity politics 
on the Left, and by implication on the movements for racial, gender, and sexual justice, among 
others. In doing so, Fukuyama ignores these movements’ distributional claims and broad-based 
advocacy for economic justice, the opposition to which is deeply structured into the liberal 
democratic project itself. He accomplishes this by painting these movements as engaged primarily 
in a politics of recognition identity politics. This leads him to recommend a politics and policies 
which are unlikely to alter the structures that generate either globalization-induced inequality or 
identity politics. Further these recommendations are likely to render the Left less politically 
successful. I focus on the African American experience in the United States, as he does in part,6 by 
way of example. 
Part I briefly outlines Fukuyama’s argument and his suggestions for overcoming the ill-
effects of nationalism on democracy. Part II explores the work of Nancy Fraser who wrote on the 
politics of distribution and recognition over twenty years ago. Fraser’s work provides some 
definitional clarity, particularly with regard to the issue of economic distribution. Her work also 
provides one way of assessing the stakes involved in some of Fukuyama’s suggestions. Part III 
provides another analysis and origin story for the rise of identity politics and its relationship to 
distributional injustice; locating these origins within the development of the liberal democratic 
project itself. This analysis further grounds a critique of Fukuyama’s stance on multiculturalism and 
political correctness. In conclusion, the essay suggests that the voices Fukuyama seeks to silence in 
his critique of identity politics may be the very ones with the vision, willingness and commitment 
to advance the kind of broad-based economic justice coalition for which Fukuyama advocates. 
I. FUKUYAMA’S ARGUMENT, BRIEFLY OUTLINED 
Fukuyama suggests that the current emergence of nationalism (or growing neo-fascism7) 
is actually a widespread populist revolt against globalization,  with its attendant high levels of 
inequality, unevenly shared benefits and rapid pace of social change.8 Although he believes that 
globalized capitalism is a positive good overall, lifting many people across the globe out of poverty, 
4 IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 121 (noting that the white nationalism rising in the US has a long history in 
Europe and is referred to as fascism). 
5 Francis Fukuyama, Against Identity Politics, 97 FOREIGN AFF. 90 (2018) [hereinafter Against Identity 
Politics]. 
6 He suggests that the 1960s type identity politics is now expressed in movements such as Black Lives Matter. 
Against Identity Politics, supra note 5. 
7 WendyBrown argues that this growing nationalism is not a resurgence of the fascisms of old but one situated 
within the governing rationality of neoliberalism. She refers to these as neo-fascisms. See WENDY BROWN, IN THE RUINS 
OF NEOLIBERALISM: THE RISE OF ANTIDEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE WEST (2019). 
8 Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 92 93. 
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he concedes that the benefits are uneven and that some people have suffered losses. People of the 
middle and working classes in the industrialized North are some of those who are suffering these 
economic losses, and thus pain and anxiety.9 Nationalism is on the rise among these groups, 
according to Fukuyama, because this economic anxiety is often felt as a loss of status and thus 
perceived as a threat to these people’s very identities.10 This is particularly so in the context of what 
Fukuyama argues is the recent rise of identity politics and the current adoption of it by those on the 
political Right. In fact, Fukuyama argues that the worst part about identity politics is that the Right 
has now begun to frame its politics through this lens.11 In addition, this perceived identity threat, 
especially from the perspective of those Fukuyama terms as traditional national identities,  has 
been made worse by globally-related high levels of immigration.12 
Much of Fukuyama’s book charts the developments leading to modern understandings of 
identity through the writings of both ancient and enlightenment scholars, as well as various events 
from around the globe. He notes that desire and reason, captured by the economic concepts of 
preferences  and rational maximizer, 13 are components of the human psyche.14 However, he 
argues, a third component of the human psyche exists; namely, the basic human need for 
recognition or what Socrates called the thymos.15 
Thymos has two forms: isothymia is the demand to be respected on an equal basis with 
other people; while megalothymia is the desire to be recognized as superior. 16 Evolving notions of 
identity lie, in part, in thymos. Fukuyama suggests that by nineteenth century Europe, the social 
manifestation of this human need for recognition had developed along two different paths socially 
and politically one focused on the individual, the other on the group. 
The first path, Fukuyama insists, led to the universal recognition of individual rights, and 
thence to liberal societies that sought to provide citizens with an ever-expanding scope of individual 
autonomy. 17 In fact, he believes that liberal democracies largely but imperfectly meet isothymia  
human beings need for equal recognition of their inner worth through mechanisms such as the 
9 See, e.g., Aime Picchi, Millennials are falling out of the U.S. middle class, CBS NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/millennials-are-falling-out-of-the-u-s-middle-class/ [https://perma.cc/7UCK-KYTF] 
(noting that the share of people in the middle-class is falling across developed nations). 
10 Fukuyama argues economic income is linked to status. He notes that economic distress is often perceived 
by individuals not as resource deprivation, but as a loss of identity.  IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 89. He explains: 
While the economic inequalities arising from the last fifty or so years of globalization are a major 
factor explaining contemporary politics, economic grievances become much more acute when they 
are attached to feelings of indignity and disrespect. Indeed, much of what we understand to be 
economic motivation actually reflects not a straightforward desire for wealth and resources, but the 
fact that money is perceived to be a marker of status and buys respect. 
Id. at 10 11. 
11 Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 101. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
12 IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 17. 
13 Id. at 18. 
14 Id. at 85. Fukuyama explains, however, that these components cannot adequately explain the soldier falling 
on the grenade. Id. at 15. 
15 Id. at 17. 
16 Id. at xiii. 
17 Id. at 65. 
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universal franchise, formal equality, and the rule of law. At the same time, he believes the market 
economy provides an outlet for megalothymia through which people who require exceptional 
recognition might find it. 
But the second path manifesting the human need for recognition socially, politically and 
economically led to assertions of collective identity, 18 and a demand for recognition of the group. 
Fukuyama argues that the two major manifestations of this path were nationalism, fascism, and 
politicized religion (here he focuses on modern day Islamism).19 These arise in contexts in which 
modernization and rapid social change alter or disrupt formerly stable shared forms of identity. The 
move from agrarian to industrial lifestyles occasioned by the industrial revolution exemplify this 
process. The resulting crisis of identity often leads [people] . . . to the search for a common 
identity; 20 and a demand for the recognition of this separate common identity identity politics.21 
Fukuyama suggests that the human demand for recognition is a master concept and 
explains much of what is going on globally today.22 That is, he suggests that behavior, often 
characterized as economically motivated, is actually motivated by a need for recognition and for 
maintaining, restoring or bestowing status.23 He argues that much of what we understand to be 
economic motivation actually reflects not a straightforward desire for wealth and resources, but the 
fact that money is perceived to be a marker of status and buys respect; 24 while economic distress 
is often perceived by individuals not as resource deprivation, but as a loss of identity, 25 or indignity. 
18 Id. at 56 57. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 56. 
21 He notes however, that modern notions of identity were not culturally salient until well into the twentieth 
century. Identity politics, which grew out of this sense of identity, arose in the 1960s with the emergence of the civil rights, 
feminist, and other identity  based movements. These movements, Fukuyama suggests, were presented with a choice. They 
could demand that society treat [their] members the same way it treated the members of dominant groups, or [they] could 
assert a separate identity for [their] members and demand respect for them as different from the mainstream society.  
Separate identities often won. The political Right, Fukuyama argues, now plays on this platform. They manifest in a resurgent 
nationalism in which the loss of status, by groups and the middle class in particular, is perceived as an attack on their dignity 
and identity. Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 97, 101 04. 
22 Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 92. 
23 IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 8 11. 
24 Id. at 11. 
25 Id. at 89. Fukuyama seems correct in this assessment. However, in focusing on class as status, he may be 
ignoring, or perhaps rejecting, the conception of class as deeply structured and relational with class relations as a source of 
the growing inequality within countries, including the shrinking of middle classes. The notion of structured economic class 
relations, where my wealth is structurally related to your poverty, better captures a U.S. economy where the economy is 
growing and productivity continues to increase. In this economy, the wealthiest Americans through their control or 
association with corporations (or because the means of production are privatized), are taking the vast majority of these 
productivity increases either through higher wages or capital gains. Importantly, they are doing so in relation to and at the 
expense of the middle and working classes upon which their associated corporations depend to both produce and consume 
their goods and services. See, e.g., Aime Picchi, supra note 9 (noting that middle classes are shrinking across developed 
countries). For a discussion of class structures see, e.g., Erik Olin Wright, From Grand Paradigm Battles to Pragmatist 
Realism: Towards an Integrated Class Analysis, UNDERSTANDING CLASS 1, 1 19 (Erik Olin Wright ed., 2015) (seeking to 
integrate various notions of class and the way in which they operate); Athena D. Mutua, Introducing ClassCrits: From Class 
Blindness to a Critical Legal Analysis of Economic Inequality, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 859, 859 914 (2008) (discussing relational 
understandings of class drawing on Marx and Weber and citing, among others, Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol23/iss1/3 
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This idea is supported, Fukuyama suggests, by the fact that middle class people, those who appear 
to be losing their status, rather than the outright poor, are driving the nationalist movements.26 
To address these problems, Fukuyama recommends that the political Left return to a focus 
on economic policies, to a politics of distribution; instead of its current focus on identity politics.27 
That is, he argues the Left should return to advocating for economic policies, such as the U.S. 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), which seek to expand economic wellbeing and benefits to large 
collectivities.28 The ACA is a near universal health insurance plan that meets people’s economic 
needs, he says, regardless of their previous condition, race or other identity, etc.29 Presumably, 
policies like the ACA would not only begin to address some of people’s real economic needs, but 
also their felt (status) needs as well. Fukuyama also suggests that countries build and/or strengthen 
their commitments to a national creed. This creed should be one on which a wide range of people 
can agree, immigrants can assimilate  into, and about which nationals can be both reminded and 
educated.30 
He notes that France and the U.S. have national creeds.31 France, he suggests, has a creedal 
commitment to liberty, equality, and fraternity. While the U.S. creed, he argues, is based on a belief 
in the common political principles of constitutionalism, the rule of law, democratic accountability, 
and the principle that all [people] are created equal.’’32 However, he admits that the U.S. creed has 
developed through struggle over decades and to this day [is] not accepted by all Americans. 33 I 
would suggest the creed is inspirational and possibly aspirational at best. At its worst, it simply 
masks practices meant to perpetuate elite control of society, as well as, white racial domination and 
privilege.34 
Nevertheless, in many ways I agree with Professor Fukuyama that we need to return to a 
more honest and robust discussion of our economic circumstances and the structures and policies 
that shape them. Further, I believe he is correct in suggesting that European citizenship be 
American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 845 (2003)). Though Fukuyama 
situates his analysis within creative-destructive global capitalism, his notion of class as a politics of recognition or felt status 
does not seem to do justice to both the actual material harm these lower classes experience at the hands of wealthy and elite  
corporate decision makers or the processes that in part generate that harm. Fraser’s notion of class may get closer to capturing 
these relations. See infra notes 37 40 and accompanying text. 
26 IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 87 ( noting that the perceived threat to middle-class status may then explain the 
rise of populist nationalism in many parts of the world in the second decade of the twenty-first century ). It is important to 
note here that a majority of those earning under $50,000 a year did not vote for Trump; rather, those earning more than this 
and thus situated in the middle class more solidly supported him. See Jon Henley, White and Wealthy Voters Gave Victory 
to Donald Trump, Exit Polls Show, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/nov/09/white-voters-victory-donald-trump-exit-polls [https://perma.cc/F6HD-7MS2] (noting that 52% of those 
who earned under $50,000 voted for Clinton while 41% voted for Trump). 
27 Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 112. 
28 Id. 
29 IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 178. 
30 Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 104 08. 
31 Id. at 109. 
32 IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 158. 
33 Id. at 154. 
34 Fukuyama would no doubt disagree. But he admits that there is another deep-rooted tradition and 
understanding of American society based on an exclusionary, ethnic, cultural and racial vision. Id. at 156 62. 
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determined by birth in a country instead of ethnicity, in addition to naturalization.35 I am also 
intrigued by his suggestion of requiring national service for all youth. And finally, I agree that 
multicultural and multi-racially diverse countries must build and/or strengthen their commitments 
to a national, if not a transnational, creed.36 
Although Fukuyama suggests that we have more honest discussions about our economic 
circumstances (including globalization), both his theory and his own commitments to a liberal 
democracy seem to limit that discussion. That is, he largely remains committed to maintaining 
current market arrangements under capitalist relations (with some regulation), a feature of liberal 
democracy. 
II. RECOGNITION V. DISTRIBUTION (ECONOMIC) CLAIMS 
Both Fukuyama and Nancy Fraser are concerned about the displacement of economic 
justice advocacy on the Left by the advocacy of increasingly fragmented group-based justice 
projects. Fraser wrote on the politics of distribution and recognition over twenty years ago in her 
book, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the Postsocialist Condition.37 However, Fraser is 
committed to a more egalitarian political economy, one that may be prohibited by Fukuyama’s 
commitment to capitalism. 
Fukuyama frames identity politics, ultimately, as a struggle for dignity as against 
invisibility. But he would likely agree with Nancy Fraser’s definition of identity politics as a 
cultural politics of recognition. In her words, cultural injustice is rooted in social patterns of 
representation, interpretation, and communication. 38 Cultural injustice includes practices of 
cultural domination, nonrecognition or invisibility, and disrespect, among others. In short, Fraser 
suggests that politics of recognition are projects that seek to address misrecognition. Sexuality, as 
an ideal type, is an example of a mode of social differentiation that is rooted in the cultural valuation 
structures.39 The injustice that people who identify as LGBTQ+ suffer is heterosexism, the 
35 Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 106 07. 
36 A transnational creed might entail something similar to the international human rights corpus but with a 
more robust commitment (and mechanism to meet this commitment) to economic and social rights. For a critique of the 
current international human rights corpus, see e.g., Makau W. Mutua, Human Rights and Powerlessness: Pathologies of 
Choice and Substance, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1027 (2008), Makau W. Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: the Metaphor of 
Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 201, 201 245 (2001) (also summarized in EVE DARIAN-SMITH, LAWS AND SOCIETIES 
IN GLOBAL CONTEXTS: CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 84 96 (2013), and Makua W. Mutua, The Ideology of Human 
Rights: Toward Post-Liberal Democracy?,  in GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN AFRICA 109 164 (Kofi E. Quashigah and 
Obiora C. Okafor, eds., 1999). 
37 See NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE POST SOCIALIST 
CONDITION (1997). 
38 Id. at 14. In explaining these examples, Fraser elaborates: Examples include cultural domination (being 
subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and are alien and/or hostile 
to one’s own); non-recognition (being rendered invisible by means of the authoritative representational, communicative, and 
interpretative practices of one’s culture); and disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public cultural 
representations and/or in everyday life interactions).  
39 Id. at 32. Fraser in this discussion is using ideal types. She later complicates this analysis  by noting that 
cultural ideas and practices have distributional consequences, distributional structures have cultural explanations and 
rationalizations, and these are mutually reinforcing. For instance, the cultural demeaning of LGBTQ+ people plays out in  
economic discrimination and the social creation of structures to exclude them. 
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authoritative construction of norms that privilege heterosexuality.  This requires a change in social 
valuation.40 It should be noted that LGBTQ+ people are spread across all classes in society. 
Though Fukuyama advocates for the Left to return to a politics of economics, class, or 
distribution, he never defines or concretely engages with what a politics of distribution is given the 
ills of globalization. This results in part because he understands identity politics to include economic 
status or status claims related to income and wealth.41 Recall that Fukuyama argues that much of 
what appears to be individuals’ economic motivation is about access to resources as a marker of 
status (not about access to resources to counter outright deprivation).42 As a result, he does not 
define distribution. Rather, he simply proposes the Affordable Care Act as an example of an 
appropriate economic policy. This example is meant to demonstrate that people can often 
compromise on economic issues, while issues of dignity are non-negotiable.43 Yet given the Cold 
War and current wars around resources, the assertion that people can more easily compromise on 
economic issues is debatable. 
Nevertheless, Fraser provides a definition of a politics of distribution.44 In doing so, she 
affords us at least one way to assess Fukuyama’s suggestions and their ability to address the 
economic problems that threaten identity and give rise to nationalism. 
Fraser suggests that a politics of distribution is meant to remedy the maldistribution of 
resources and argues that socioeconomic injustice . . . is rooted in the political-economic structure 
of society. 45 These injustices typically include structures of exploitation, economic 
marginalization, and deprivation.46 Using an ideal type, she suggests that class is the paradigmatic 
example of a mode of social differentiation that is rooted in the political-economic structure of 
society. 47 A class exists as a collectivity only by virtue of its position in that structure 48 and in 
relation to other classes. Thus, the injustices that arise in these social arrangements are generally 
matters of distribution. 
Finally, Fraser posits two types of remedies that are or can be used to address both 
maldistribution and misrecognition. These are affirmation  and transformation. 49 Affirmative 
remedies are meant to correct inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the 
underlying framework that generates them. 50 
Fraser suggests that the liberal welfare state  is an affirmative remedy that establishes 
income subsidies, for example, as a remedy for maldistribution of incomes.51 Mainstream 
multiculturalism  is the affirmative remedy for misrecognition and seeks to re-allocate respect.52 
40 Id. at 18. 
41 IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 92. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 176. 
44 FRASER, supra note 37, at 13. 
45 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 17. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 23 26. 
50 Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
51 Id. at. 24 25. 
52 Id. at. 24. 
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An example of a multicultural remedy might be policies that include more people of a disrespected 
group in public broadcasts. Like Fukuyama, she suggests that these affirmative actions tend to 
support and reinforce group differentiation.53 
Transformational remedies, in contrast, seek to correct inequitable outcomes precisely by 
restructuring the underlying generative framework. 54 These, she suggests, are represented by 
socialism as a distributional remedy and deconstruction as a remedy for misrecognition.55 Socialism 
and other transformational distributional remedies seek to restructure the relations of production by 
combining universalist social-welfare programs, steeply progressive taxation, macroeconomic 
policies aimed at creating full employment, a large nonmarket public sector, significant public 
and/or collective ownership, and democratic decision making about basic socioeconomic 
priorities. 56 
Deconstruction would redress disrespect by transforming the underlying cultural-
valuational structure . . . [b]y destabilizing existing group identities and differentiations. 57 For 
example, to deconstruct the gender system, a politics of recognition would seek to dismantle 
androcentrism by destabilizing gender dichotomies.  This process may be underway due in part to 
LBGTQ+ activism, particularly Trans activism.58 Or in the U.S. racial context, the goal would not 
be simply to seek respect for a particular group but to dismantle Eurocentrism by destabilizing 
racial dichotomies. 59 
Fraser’s framework provides not only firmer evidence about what is at stake in 
distributional claims but also at least one way of assessing different policies. For instance, ACA-
like plans  policies that Fukuyama suggests the Left undertake are affirmative distributional 
remedies under Fraser’s framework. The ACA is a social welfare mechanism and regulation meant 
to address the excesses and failures in the United States’ health care market. The ACA does not 
deal with the underlying structures that make health insurance unaffordable for many, whether 
because these underlying economic structures render large groups of people financially vulnerable 
or because they simply render health care far too expensive. Rather, the ACA’s purpose is simply 
to rearrange or redistribute players or money once the inequitable outcomes are generated.60 And it 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 23. 
55 Id. at. 25. 
56 Id. at 25 26. The idea of democratizing basic socioeconomic priorities tends to call for expanding 
democracy all the way down to the economic level at a time when the political Right appears to be moving away from even 
political democracy and toward authoritarianism. 
57 Id. at 24. 
58 Id. at 29. LGBTQ+ rights, including Trans rights, problematize gender (male/female) dichotomies and 
roles. See, e.g., Eleonora Lamm, Gender identity and reproductive autonomy. Deconstructing sex, gender and roles, GATE 
(2019), https://transactivists.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Gender-Identity-and-Reproductive-Autonomy-GATE-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5WD8-9MKJ]. 
59 Id. at 31. 
60 Fukuyama would likely agree with the opinions of Roger Lowenstein and Peggy Noonan who, within two 
days of one another in the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal respectively, argued that capitalism is the goose that 
laid the golden egg of aggregate wealth growth and thus must be saved. The way to save it is through ensuring that the felt 
economic needs of people be met through programs like ACA, increased taxes, even money for mental health, etc. These 
arguments were made in response to the release of a plan for New Green Deal by a diverse group of freshman U.S. Congress 
people. In other words, Fukuyama, Lowenstein, and Noonan argue that the structures that generate the outcome of inequality 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol23/iss1/3 
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must do so over the objections of the classes of people structured by and who help structure the 
capitalist health-care market and thus benefit from its inequitable and thus profitable provision. 
III. ORIGIN STORY: LIBERALISM’S IDENTITY POLITICS 
Both Fukuyama and Fraser agree that identity politics are a recent phenomenon and that 
the shift occurred on the political Left. I disagree; at most the current politics are simply a new 
phase in an ongoing struggle for human freedom against oppression, one at the heart of liberalism. 
I believe that Fukuyama inappropriately blames the rise of identity politics on the political 
Left. The story he tells is that the white Left first shifted from building solidarity around large 
collectivities such as the working class or the economically exploited  to identity politics.61 These 
identity politics focus on smaller groups and narrower experiences of marginalization and injustice. 
In the U.S. this arises, according to Fukuyama, against the backdrop of a therapeutic movement 
meant to address the human longing not just for material security, but for self-esteem and dignity.62 
And it occurred, he suggests, when the Left’s dreams of a large welfare state met the fiscal 
constraints and stagflation crises of the 1970s, when the U.S. civil rights and feminist movements, 
which he sees as a politics of recognition, were well underway, and when socialist experiments in 
various countries began to fail.63 The Right, which is overwhelmingly white, he suggests, has now 
followed the Left’s lead.64 
Yet another story could be told here: one that starts at the beginning of the story instead of 
the middle of it. This other story locates the modern emergence of identity politics in the economic 
ascent and imperialism of Europe (in practice if not in name). In this version of the story, identity 
politics arise when Native Americans are marked for ethnic cleansing and genocide so that their 
land can be taken and used for the benefit of Europeans, and African knowledge and labor are 
exploited for the benefit of the same.65 European and American enslavement and later colonization 
of Africans, among other transnational practices, aid in spurring three related socioeconomic 
phenomena: the industrial revolution, the cultural ideology of white supremacy, and the 
institutionalization, through law and practice, of the economic (distributional) and cultural 
(recognition) imperatives engendered by these first two developments. 
also create growth, and thus should be maintained with redistribution occurring after capitalism has worked its growth magic. 
The question is whether the political right will allow this redistribution. A deeper question, I would submit, is whether growth 
is sustainable in the long run. See, e.g., Roger Lowenstein, A lesson for the Democratic left from Adam Smith, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/a-lesson-for-the-democratic-left-from-adam-smith/2019/02/15/ 
00925d14-308b-11e9-86ab-5d02109aeb01_story.html [https://perma.cc/6NDB-YVZE]; Peggy Noonan, Republicans Need 
to Save Capitalism, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/republicans-need-to-save-capitalism-
11550189297 [https://perma.cc/3AUY-WLYS]. 
61 IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 96. 
62 Id. at 112. 
63 Id. at 110 112. 
64 Id. at 121. 
65 Id. at 137. Fukuyama recognizes this process but sees these practices as (simply) paths to nationhood. Id. 
at 141 42. It might be that he sees these as the negative practices of nationalism. For instance, he refers to these practices as 
ethnic cleansing. Id. But the discussion is not framed as practices of nationalism or identity politics. Further, these processes 
of ethnic cleansing and slavery structure the very modernization process that Fukuyama discusses as a cause for nationalism. 
Id. In this way, his historiography of the rise of nationalism seems problematic. 
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Regarding industrialization, many scholars have now accepted the milder form of Eric 
Williams’ argument about slavery and industrialization, acknowledging that European enslavement 
of Africans helped spur the English industrial revolution and thus was part and parcel of the 
processes that initiated modern sustained growth under capitalist relations.66 Further, new findings 
suggest that enslavement was essential to American industrialization and capitalist development, 
fueling its accumulation of wealth on the assets of Native and African Americans, among others.67 
Thus, from the beginning, to use Fraser’s phrasing, race  structured the transnational capitalist 
division of labor: first structuring the economic division and distribution of work between free and 
enslaved, and then between high paid, high status and low paid, low status work, as well as access 
to official employment. Whites occupy the former and have much greater access to official 
employment in the modern moment.68 
White supremacy, on the other hand, may have started off as simply the cultural 
rationalizations of the economic practice of genocide and enslavement.69 But it soon developed into 
a self-perpetuating structure of cultural representation that inhered in Western politics of 
recognition. This interpreted and misrecognized white and whiteness as superior. In this sense, 
megathymia appears not as an individual trait, but a collective or group trait, nourished more by 
supremacist ideology than by psychological innateness. At the same time, Native and African 
Americans were seen as both inferior and degenerate. Thus, race combined with economic class 
status in the structure of class relations. 
In this way, race for the subordinate in particular, is bivalent, as Fraser explains, 
encompassing both issues of misrecognition and maldistribution.70 And it may be this bivalence (or 
the intersection of race and class)71 that provides a more complicated, but more accurate explanation 
66 ERIC WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY 170 71 (1944). See also, Nicholas Draper, The Price of 
Emancipation: Slave-ownership, Compensation and British Society at the End of Slavery, in STUDIES IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
11 (Paul Johnson et al. eds., 2010) (noting that acceptance of a mild form of Williams’ thesis is wide-spread). Draper 
summarizes Williams four theses as follows: 
Racism was a result, not a cause, of slavery; that Britain’s Industrial Revolution was heavily 
dependent on the slave-economy; that the slave economy suffered a decline after the American 
Revolution; and that the slave abolition of the slave-trade and of slavery itself was motivated not by 
disinterested humanitarianism but by rational economic calculation. 
Id. 
67 See generally EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE MAKING OF 
AMERICAN CAPITALISM 19 (2014); WALTER JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK DREAMS: SLAVERY AND EMPIRE IN THE COTTON 
KINGDOM 254 (2013); Sven Beckert & Seth Rockman, Slavery’s Capitalism, in SLAVERY’S CAPITALISM: A NEW HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5 6 (Sven Beckert & Seth Rockman eds., 2016). 
68 FRASER, supra note 37, at 20 21 
69 Fraser states as follows: 
Most material economic institutions have a constitutive, irreducible cultural dimension; they are shot 
through with significations and norms. Conversely, even the most discursive cultural practices have 
a constitutive, irreducible political-economic dimension; they are underpinned by material supports. 
Thus, far from occupying two airtight separate spheres, economic injustice and cultural injustice are 
usually imbricated so as to reinforce each other dialectically. 
FRASER, supra note 37, at 15 (noting that economic justice and cultural justice are intertwined). 
70 Fukuyama might agree in that the claim for dignity for him incudes distributional claims in part.  
71 This is not a perfect interpretation of the bivalent idea. But to the extent people understand race as status, 
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for the re-emergence of nationalism/neo-fascism today. That is, though nationalism by definition is 
exclusory, bivalence may better explain the increased animosity toward specific immigrants (e.g., 
Mexicans in the U.S.) and groups, as well as the hostility toward their concrete distributional claims; 
distributional claims which Fukuyama’s philosophy inadequately theorizes. 
Finally, these two phenomena (industrialization and white supremacy) were 
institutionalized, for example, in the U.S. Constitution, in which elite (property owning) white males 
crafted liberal government and social arrangements that they controlled and of which they were the 
primary beneficiaries. That is, they assured that those sharing the identities of elite white maleness 
would reap the benefits of leadership, control and access to the lions’ share of the country’s 
resources. In contrast, those marked and identified as something other than rich, white and male 
would bear the burdens of maldistribution and misrecognition through oppression, suppression, 
exploitation, marginalization, deprivation and disrespect in mutually reinforcing ways. This was 
identity politics at its finest! 
Fukuyama does not like this story. He complains that its narrators’ intimate that the 
problems this process generated are written into the country’s DNA.72 Be that as it may, this is the 
history of the liberal democratic project in the UK and U.S. and, with varying details, that of the 
West.73 Fukuyama attempts to elude these foundational arrangements and their consequences in the 
U.S. by making three related arguments. First, he situates his preferred story about the United States 
in a post-Civil War frame. Second he ignores the distributional claims and advocacy of subordinated 
groups and thus paints, in this case, black resistance, as primarily a politics of recognition. Third, 
he then advocates against the affirmative remedy for these misrecognition claims  
multiculturalism. 
The result is twofold. First this group’s concrete distributional (economic justice) claims 
and advocacy are dismissed in part because they are subsumed under a politics of recognition. This 
is so, even as a commitment to current economic arrangements might prevent their accomplishment 
in any case. But second, then the primary remedy for rectifying their misrecognition claims  
multiculturalism (under Fukuyama’s preferred approach affirmative rather than 
transformational) is also viewed as inappropriate. Taken together Fukuyama’s recommendations 
re-impose invisibility on black claims and social justice visions while letting stand and prioritizing, 
as currently manifest, the understandings, goals, resentments, prerogatives and privileges of 
traditional nationals.  
A. A Post Civil War Frame? 
Fukuyama tries to evade the foundational arrangements of white privilege and black 
oppression codified in the U.S. Constitution by emphasizing the creedal commitment to equality  
found in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and established in constitutional law in the passage 
of the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War.74 This then supports his preferred American story 
this more modern formulation the intersection of caste status and class may capture pieces of it. 
72 Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 108; IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 170. 
73 See generally CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT (1997) (using social contract theory to argue 
that the social contract of liberal philosophers was a racial contract, one which was limited to white men).  
74 Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 97. One gets this impression more from the essay than the book. 
In his book, Fukuyama recognizes that it takes almost one hundred years before the promises of the Fourteenth amendment 
are even implemented at the level of law. That it is embraced at the level of law appears to forward his story of a country 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 
38 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 23.1 
of an ever expanding embrace of wider groups of Americans initially excluded. In preferring this 
story, he diminishes the black struggle and its identity politics in general as simply a cry of 
victimization  instead of a critique, in part, of crimes against humanity  and restitution for stolen 
wealth. 
But the post-Civil War frame does little to get Fukuyama around the continuing economic 
and cultural oppression of African Americans in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. First the 
creed of equality and the Fourteenth Amendment themselves were undermined in a host of violent 
and legally-blinked practices.75 These culminated in the Supreme Court decision of Plessy v. 
Ferguson, which itself enshrined in legal doctrine and social practice the apartheid system of racial 
segregation and triggered the formal legal institution of Jim Crow. This institution was not 
overturned at the level of law until the Brown decision in 1954 and the 1960s Civil Rights 
Movement. Rather than initiating identity politics, it was this movement that instead midwifed the 
birth of legal changes in the United States a movement waged in reaction to the identity politics 
and maldistribution of resources put in place by the foundational documents, laws and practices of 
increasingly embracing and extending wider groups of people beyond the traditional national majorities.  
75 Consider for instance, the case of United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). The case arose out of 
the Colfax Massacre in which whites killed over a hundred African American Freedmen in a contested election in a majority 
black parish in Louisiana. Of the hundreds involved, only three white men were convicted of violating Section Six of the 
1870 Enforcement Act, which together, with the indictment, raised First, Second and Fourteenth Amendment issues 
including issues of privileges or immunities,  due process and equal protection. The Supreme Court overturned the 
convictions holding the indictments insufficient and the constitutional issues, in short, inapplicable to private actions. James 
Pope has argued that this case is one of the most important cases decided by the Supreme Court and yet it is not a part of the 
legal canon. See James Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank (1876) Belongs at the Heart of the 
American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 385 (2014). It is important because it was one of the first 
cases to propound a number of significant Fourteenth amendment doctrines and it did so in troubling ways and in the violent 
context of Reconstruction. Pope posits that the Court in refusing to punish white anti-black violence in this case helped to 
unleash the violence that brought Reconstruction to an end. Id. at 412. On interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, Pope 
suggests, that it is in: (1) Cruikshank rather than the Civil Rights Cases which the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted 
as not applying to private action and requiring (affirmative) state action; (2) Cruikshank rather than Slaughter-House where 
the Court resolved that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the States (absent evolving incorporation); (3) Cruikshank, not the 
Civil Rights Cases or Boerne that the Court cut back on Congress’s discretion to choose the means of implementing the 
Constitution; and (4) Cruikshank rather than Washington v. Davis that first articulated a standard requiring proof of racial 
intent. Id. at 385. Pope argues that the Court established these standards in the context of extreme racial violence where such 
intent was obvious and against the specific purposes for which the Enforcement Acts were enacted the purposes of halting 
white violence and protecting African American citizenship rights. Id. at 411. 
Pope further postulates that the usual state rights v. federal rights  argument fades in importance when Cruikshank is added 
to the canon because here the national government was actually trying to support a duly elected state government in 
exercising its authority as against white anti-black violence, an effort undermined by the Cruikshank Court. Id. at 391. The 
problem was that the state government involved was not all white, as had been previous state governments but rather a duly 
elected multiracial state government. Id. Finally, for the larger purposes of this essay, Pope suggests that omission of 
Cruikshank from the legal canon allows the canon, as currently constructed, to paint black advocacy as simply middle class 
demands for access to public accommodations such as theaters, as opposed to issues around labor, power, and resources, 
much as Fukuyama paints black struggle as a politics of recognition. Id. at 392 93. Pope notes in contrast, that much of what 
was going on during Reconstruction was primarily about labor control; emancipated Freed people were predominately 
laborer workers. Id. at 419 20. And it is worth remembering that they were producing one of the most important commodities 
in the world at the time cotton. 
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white colonial settlers those who Fukuyama deems the traditional national identity. 76 And it is 
this story that may well be the reality of liberal democracies: As they historically rest on oppressive 
dominant ethnic groups, they can only be made less imperfect  by redistribution, recognition and 
coalitional politics in favor of those who bear the brunt of their exclusions. 
B. Distributional Claims & Advocacy, Multiculturalism & Colorblindness 
Second, Fukuyama ignores the distributional claims and advocacy of black resistance. 
Having done so, he is free to paint this resistance as primarily a politics against misrecognition. 
Though enforced economic degradation and violence is a form of disrespect, the 
distributional claims embodied in black struggle run to the core of the American political and 
economic arrangements, arrangements Fukuyama largely supports. To be fair, Fukuyama concedes 
that there is nothing wrong with identity politics per se and that such politics on the part of 
historically disadvantaged groups are meant to improve the material conditions of the group.77 
Further he concedes that the realization of racial and gender justice is incomplete and must 
somehow be continued.78 
Nevertheless, his analysis stymies these efforts by painting them as simply a politics of 
recognition. He ignores the fact that race in the form of black struggle is deeply bivalent and that 
blacks are not only culturally demeaned, stereotyped and disrespected but also economically 
subordinated. Further, the black struggle has always been about exploitation, marginalization and 
deprivation. 
For instance, he ignores the fact that schools are more segregated today than they were 
when Brown was decided in 1954, with attendant disparities in resource allocation. He blinks the 
fact that blacks today still fare significantly worse than whites on almost all economic indicia of 
well-being. And he appears unaware of the fact that the current Movement for Black Lives’ 
Platform,79 is reminiscent of the Black Panthers’ 1966 Ten Point Plan, the 1948 Declaration of 
Negro Voters and even Garvey’s 1920’s Beliefs of UNIA  and Declaration of Rights of the Negro 
Peoples of the World.80 These platforms often included demands for concrete resources, such as 
power, land, reparations, employment, housing, education, and cessation of police brutality. Police 
abuse, also referred to as modern-day lynching,81 is simply one form of violence, employed by both 
76 IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 149. The phrase dominant culture and people  might be the more appropriate 
phrase. Fukuyama sometimes uses this phrase in the book. Otherwise, one would think that both Native Americans and 
African Americas, as well as perhaps Mexican Americans among others, arguably as part of original stock of the country, 
should be seen as traditional nationals  and inheritors of the country’s wealth. Further, they should be part of the group 
defining the contours of American policies (particularly Fukuyama’s view that nations must be able to define their borders). 
But when framed from this perspective of traditional nationals, notions of assimilation  seem even more problematic. 
Fukuyama would argue that this dominant group is the progenitor of the current liberal democracy  of which he is so fond. 
77 Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 108. 
78 Id. 
79 See Platform, THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES PLATFORM, https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/ 
[https://perma.cc/LXJ6-MZUR]. 
80 See generally Athena D. Mutua, Restoring Justice to Civil Rights Movement Activists?: New 
Historiography and the Long Civil Rights Era, Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008 12 (2008) (discussing the 
Black Panther Platform and citing these other platforms.) 
81 MARTHA BIONDI, TO STAND AND FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY 
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the state and some white people, meant to keep current allocations of distribution and recognition 
in place. Further Fukuyama ignores that the March on Washington was a March for Jobs and 
Freedom,  and that it was Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC) that led the multiracial Poor People’s Campaign effort, begun just before 
King’s assassination. 
These omissions allow Fukuyama to not only paint black movements as primarily cultural 
but then both to mourn the group differentiation effects of mainstream multiculturalism,  and to 
pretend that policies such as colorblindness actually work. Said differently, Fukuyama argues that 
the Left should abandon identity politics generally and multiculturalism in particular because it 
reinforces group identity and separateness, as well as, provokes (white) resentment (neither he nor 
Fraser attempt to figure out how countries such as Sweden and Canada appear to engage affirmative 
remedies without generating the same high level of group differentiation or resistance from 
privileged groups). 
Further, according to Fukuyama, multiculturalism entails a request for, what he 
characterizes as, special consideration.82 Fukuyama condemns this alleged request for special 
consideration noting that Martin Luther King, as opposed to the Black Panthers, only asked for 
black people to be treated the same as white people.83 Of course, he simply ignores King’s appraisals 
that the cry of Black Power’ [was], at bottom, a reaction to the reluctance of white power to make 
the kind of changes necessary to make justice a reality for the Negro; 84 or that the problems of 
racial injustice and economic injustice cannot be solved without a radical redistribution of political 
and economic power; 85 or finally, that the evils of capitalism are as real as the evils of militarism 
and . . . racism. 86 That is, King did not simply want black folks to be treated like whites under the 
current unequal arrangements; rather, he apparently wanted transformational remedies that unified 
both the politics of distribution and recognition. He wanted the kind of distributional and 
recognitional changes that would ensure everyone’s wellbeing and dignity.87 
At the same time, by ignoring these distributional concerns and supporting the idea that 
hierarchically structured social groups should be merely treated the same, Fukuyama can celebrate 
the governmental policies and the Supreme Court’s doctrine of colorblindness. He can celebrate it 
because it undermines multicultural awareness and consideration. However, as untold numbers of 
scholars and others have pointed out, colorblindness simply leaves the hierarchy in place; it cements 
and reinforces maldistribution, with its attendant racist rationalizations in the already racially 
60 (2003). 
82 IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 111 (discussing special consideration demanded by minority groups). 
83 Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 97; IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 108. 
84 Martin Luther King, Jr., A Riot is the Language of the Unheard, CBS NEWS (Sept. 27, 1966), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mlk-a-riot-is-the-language-of-the-unheard/ [https://perma.cc/Z57D-76WN]. 
85 Martin Luther King, Jr., The Three Evils of Society, Address at the National Conference on New Politics 
(Aug. 31, 1967) (transcript available at SCRIBD (Sept. 21, 2019)), https://www.scribd.com/doc/134362247/Martin-Luther-
King-Jr-The-Three-Evils-of-Society-1967 [https://perma.cc/2Q37-YBTT]). 
86 DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN 
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 551 2 (1986). 
87 Singh suggests the black civil rights movement was one of the few (presumably racial and ethnic) based 
group movements that advocated for policies broader than those that would simply benefit themselves. See SINGH, infra note 
92. Fukuyama seems to suggest that all political identity groups have narrow and exclusive goals.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol23/iss1/3 
2020] LIBERALISM'S IDENTITY POLITICS 41
structured political economy.88 Given that appreciating these outcomes is not rocket science,
presumably policy makers are well aware of this dynamic and are indifferent to it, or they actually
intend these outcomes.
And finally, even if the Left eliminated its support for multiculturalism as an affirmative
remedy for misrecognition, this would likely do nothing to decrease the use of identity politics on
the Right. According to Fukuyama, the proverbial cat of identity politics is out of the bag. Thus, it
would seem that eliminating the Left’s engagement with multicultural politics, even when coupled
with liberal welfare state distribution remedies like ACA, would simply hobble the Left’s various
mobilization strategies.
For instance, recall that Senator Bernie Sanders, in his bid for the democratic presidential
nomination in 2016, espoused policies that some viewed as a significant expansion of the U.S.
welfare state (relatively free healthcare and college education). And yet he ran into significant
problems in generating African American support a significant force within the Democratic
Party in part because he initially had little to say about racism and its potential impact on the
distribution of such goods to communities of color. In addition, he had no position on police
violence, a historically used tool of oppression and economic subordination.89 Consider police
violence against striking workers.90 He failed to even see, let alone address a significant and serious
issue that not only affects black communities but is often used to stifle dissent against unjust social
and economic policies.
Further, it is not clear that this kind of blindness on the Left would have the multicultural
awareness to recognize that a healthcare insurance policy like ACA would need targeted provisions
in addition to its universal application to make it useful for some disadvantaged groups. In targeting
some of its provisions, policymakers would have to ask: will this provide real healthcare access to
people in urban communities or rural areas that have limited access to clinics and hospitals? That
88 See, e.g., MICHELE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 236 44 (2012) (arguing that colorblindness has proved catastrophic for African Americans ); IAN
HANEY-LOPEZ, DOGWHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM ANDWRECKED THE
MIDDLE CLASS 77, 102 (2014) (discussing the allure of colorblindness and discussing its development from an aspirational
idea to a reactionary ideological tool that enhances and furthers the new racism that has enlivened prejudice and had a
detrimental effect on the economy); see generally Francisco Valdes & Sumi Cho, Critical Race Materialism: Theorizing
Justice in the Wake of Global Neoliberalism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1513 (2011); Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV.
1589 (2009); Girardeau A. Spann, The Conscience of a Court, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 431 (2009); Ian F. Haney-López, A
Nation of Minorities: Race, Ethnicity and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007) (tracing the history of
colorblindness); Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOWARD L.J. 1, 63 90 (1995) (discussing
the fallacy of equating benign and invidious discrimination, a function of colorblindness reasoning); Jerome McCristal Culp,
Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims , 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1994) (arguing that colorblindness allows the law to maintain its bias against racial minorities).
89 See, e.g., John Wagner, A day after being heckled, Sanders speaks out against police brutality in pair of
Texas rallies, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/
2015/07/20/a-day-after-being-heckled-sanders-speaks-out-against-police-brutality-in-pair-of-texas-rallies/
[https://perma.cc/VQP9-H8VA]; Jason Horowitz, Bernie Sanders Courts Black Voters in South Carolina After Criticism on
Racial Issues, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/us/politics/a-shift-in-tone-as-
bernie-sanders-speaks-on-criminal-justice-in-south-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/WM87-ECAW].
90 See generally Kristian Williams, Cops for Labor?, DOLLAR & SENSE MAGAZINE, Sept./Oct. 2011;
KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA (Rev. ed. 2015); RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF
THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2014).
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is, it would have to recognize that people are different and differently situated (for some because of
that difference) in access to care. Some of this was done; but the question remains.
C. Same Ole Economics and White Supremacy
If the 1960s movements spurred the Left toward identity politics, as Fukuyama argues, it
had a similar effect on the Right, as exemplified in the Republican Southern Strategy. This strategy
successfully accomplished the goal of luring southern whites away from their traditional allegiance
to the Democratic Party by using references to law and order and welfare as socioeconomic
dog-whistles of race.91 Arguably, it was not the Left and its turn toward identity politics that spurred
the Right’s turn, but black activism against racialized social and economic injustice that fueled the
Right’s efforts to maintain white social and economic privileges.
That is, the difference between the Left and Right’s identity politics from the 1960s was
that the Right’s politics were not against misrecognition of whites (why advocate against pretenses
of superiority?); but rather, a politics to maintain white privileges and continue the economic
disadvantage and misrecognition of blacks, among other oppressed groups. Today’s current
populist nationalism, though focusing now on the victimization of whites, too, is simply old
politics in a new frame. In other words, although the Right’s identity politics appear to have an anti-
elite and anti-globalist frame, they remain a continuation of the white supremacist politics of the
past in new form,92 especially given the tendency toward white racial alignment.
Specifically, the Right’s current identity politics is advanced through a politics that claims
that the aspirations of others for economic justice and dignity are requests for specialness both
victimizing and made at the expense of white folks.93 Consequently, these very same everyday
91 See generally HANEY-LÓPEZ, supra note 88; ALEXANDER, supra note 88 at 43.
92 This seems particularly true given the insight that the problem of the color-line is global and that the West
verses the rest is a color-line constructed by Western colonialization, imperialism and ideology. NIKHIL PAL SINGH, BLACK
IS A COUNTRY: RACE AND THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 219 20 (2004).
93 In fact, the idea that blacks are getting special treatment is an old argument, one also made by Andrew
Johnson in regard to the newly freed enslaved. Aaron Astor, When Andrew Johnson Freed His Slaves, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2013), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/when-andrew-johnson-freed-his-slaves/
[https://perma.cc/86BE-5ZC8] (Johnson on denying them special treatment ). In fact, while the U.S. refused to provide 40
acres and a mule to these people upon whose knowledge and labor the country was built, it distributed million acres of free
(Native American) land mostly to whites in various Homestead Acts. See Homestead Act, HISTORY (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war/homestead-act [https://perma.cc/HCS5-U37R]. The Homestead Act of
1862 excluded blacks because it was limited to persons who were American citizens or who had filed necessary
documentation to become citizens. It was impossible for blacks to establish American citizenship because [the] Dred Scott
[case] had held that blacks were not, and could not be citizens under the Constitution. Jonathan K. Stubbs, Implications of
A Uniracial Worldview: Race and Rights in A New Era, 5 BARRY L. REV. 1, 15 n.56 (2005). After the Civil War, the 1862
Act and later homestead acts on their faces included black people but in practice blacks were virtually excluded. Keri Leigh
Merritt, Land and the Roots of African-American Poverty, AEON (Mar. 11, 2016), https://aeon.co/ideas/land-and-the-roots-
of-african-american-poverty [https://perma.cc/7SG7-E2LX] (noting that in the Southern Homestead Act of 1866 (SHA)
combined with the claimants of the original Homestead Act [1862], more than 1.6 million white families both native-
born and immigrant succeeded in becoming landowners during the next several decades. ). Conversely, only 4,000 to
5,500 African-American claimants ever received final land patents from the SHA. Further, the number of adult
descendants of the original Homestead Act recipients living in the year 2000 was estimated to be around 46 million people,
about a quarter of the US adult population. See also, MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMASM. SHAPIRO, BLACKWEALTH/WHITE
WEALTH: ANEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 13 15 (1997) (discussing the failure of the Homestead Act of 1866
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol23/iss1/3 
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traditional nationals  continue to support a socioeconomic maldistribution of resources that, 
despite the ills of globalization, still disproportionately favors them . . . and even more so white 
elites, with whom everyday traditional nationals  historically and currently have aligned 
themselves.94 This alignment transfers every day whites’ economic resentments toward elites onto 
more vulnerable groups, allowing whites to engage in the age old practice of kissing up, while 
kicking down, as Fukuyama acknowledges.95 And this is so even though, as he points out, everyday 
whites are angry because their very real problems are invisible to the white elite.96 
Thus, while the Right’s politics are also bivalent, they actually support a politics of 
economic maldistribution and the cultural demonization of others by reference to whites. This 
makes building a broad coalition for remedying maldistribution difficult and is the kind of identity 
politics that Fraser correctly notes is unworthy of support. Identity politics worthy of respect and 
promotion, she suggests, are those that respect human rights, seek to address the problems of 
misrecognition, and actually seek to address the economic maldistribution of resources. In this vein, 
it is important to note that many of the cross-racial movements and coalitions that currently exist, 
including those seeking broad-based economic justice seem to be led or co-led by people of color 
with some white progressive support. Consider for instance the new Poor People’s Campaign, the 
Fight for Fifteen, the Women’s March and the Chicago Teachers Union; movements willing to 
include, rather than brush aside, what appear to be distinct group issues in addition to advocating 
for broad economic issues. In fact they center racial justice among other justice projects.97 
to make a notable change in the material conditions of black people). 
94 A good example of poorer whites’ willingness to align themselves with policies supported by white elites 
and their politicians is captured in Jonathan M. Metzl’s new book. In it he describes a Tennessee man named Trevor who is 
dying of liver cancer. See JONATHAN M. METZL, DYING OF WHITENESS: HOW THE POLITICS OF RACIAL RESENTMENT IS 
KILLING AMERICA’S HEARTLAND, 3 5 (2019). Metzl notes that if Trevor lived a mere 39-minute drive away in Kentucky 
where that state participated in ACA and expanded Medicaid, he would have had access to life-saving medical treatment for 
his ailment. Id. Tennessee officials refused such health-care expansion. Id. But as Metzl noted, Trevor was not angry with 
his elected officials. Id. Instead he emphatically agreed with them exclaiming: Ain’t no way I would ever support 
Obamacare or sign up for it . . . [w]e don’t need any more government in our lives. And in any case, no way I want my tax 
dollars paying for Mexicans or welfare queen.  Id. at 4. Metzl explains he met many such people across the American 
heartland and argues that they were willing to die to protect their whiteness. Id. at 5. 
95 IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 102 04. 
96 Id. at 102. This has quite some truth in it. It may be however, that white elites see the problems but simply 
do not care, particularly where the white poor are concerned. See, e.g., NANCY ISENBERG, WHITE TRASH: THE 400-YEAR 
UNTOLD HISTORY OF CLASS IN AMERICA (2017) (arguing that the U.S. has always been a classed society and that the white 
elite think little of poor whites). On the other hand, more economically vulnerable whites may be persuaded that white 
alignment is in their interests because they are making distinctions among elites, directing their anger only toward a small 
group of eastern liberal elites,  who they believe have betrayed their cultural and economic interests. See, e.g., HANEY-
LOPEZ, supra note 88, at 31 (discussing the Southern Strategy and noting that strategists also targeted northeastern 
intellectual and cultural elites). 
97 See, e.g., Greg Kaufmann, How the Poor People’s Campaign Is Building a ‘New Electorate,’ THE NATION 
(Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/poor-peoples-campaign-2019-liz-theoharis/ [https://perma.cc/5CAY-
RKXH]; Workers head to Washington, D.C. to share their stories and win Gamechanger award!, Fight for $15, 
https://fightfor15.org/workers-head-to-washington-d-c-to-share-their-stories-and-win-gamechanger-award/ 
[https://perma.cc/DJW7-VPTD]; Sarah Jaffe, The Chicago Teachers Strike Was a Lesson in 21st-Century Organizing, THE 
NATION (Nov. 16, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/chicago-ctu-strike-win/ [https://perma.cc/HT7F-Z7ZY] 
(explaining the Union fought for much more than raises and benefits for themselves):  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 
44 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 23.1 
The most disappointing part about Fukuyama’s analysis is that it plays right into the 
Right’s brand of politics of misrecognition and maldistribution. First, he sympathizes with the 
allegation that black folks and other disadvantaged groups are in fact requesting undeserved special 
consideration as opposed to reparations and restitution for both crimes against humanity and 
appropriated wealth, as well as for the leveling up of recognition and distribution for the purposes 
of bringing about equality. Second, while advising the Left to pursue economic policies such as 
ACA, he fails to acknowledge that the Right has substantially undermined the viability of ACA.98 It 
has done so through its perverse brand of identity politics manifest in reactionary nationalism, with 
its commitment to the maldistribution of resources backed by corporate financial support, the profits 
of which are threatened by widespread access to healthcare and overall human well-being.99 
Nevertheless, Fukuyama suggests that the Left spend its energy attempting to bring the 
white working class  back into the fold;100 apparently instead of building the kind of coalition that 
They demanded smaller class sizes, prep time, nurses and counselors in every school. They put racial 
justice at the center of their demands, arguing for fair resources for schools that serve black and brown 
students, sanctuary schools for immigrants, and restorative justice practices to disrupt the school-to-
prison pipeline. Most important, they made the strike a referendum on housing in Chicago by 
demanding landmark resources for homeless students and refusing to back down when the mayor and 
her allies argued that such issues had no place at the bargaining table.  Id. 
98 See generally IDENTITY, supra note 1. See, e.g., Obamacare: Has Trump Managed to Kill off Affordable 
Care Act, BBC (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-24370967 [https://perma.cc/3HYA-RXRL]; 
Ian Stewart, As Judge Rules Obamacare Unconstitutional, Democrats Seethe, Republicans Stay Mum, NPR (Dec. 15, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/15/677036593/as-judge-rules-obamacare-unconstitutional-democrats-seethe-republicans-
stay-mum [https://perma.cc/N6KL-D9T5]; Frank J. Thompson, Michael K. Gusmano, Shugo Shinohara, Trump and the 
Affordable Care Act: Congressional Repeal Efforts, Executive Federalism, and Program Durability , 48 PUBLIUS: THE 
JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 396 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjy007 [https://perma.cc/3HYA-RXRL]; Julie 
Rovner, Timeline: Despite GOP’s Failure to Repeal Obamacare, The ACA has Changed, THE WASH. POST (April 5, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/timeline-despite-gops-failure-to-repeal-obamacare-the-aca-has-
changed/2018/04/05/dba36240-38b1-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story.html [https://perma.cc/JFR6-JYZX]. 
99 See, e.g., Matthew Johnston, Insurance in the Age of Obamacare (AET, CI), INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 12, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/061615/how-obamacare-affected-insurance-industry.asp 
[https://perma.cc/HV74-67XR] (noting the insurance companies’ initial opposition to ACA). On the corporate and business 
interests in, as well as the neoclassical economic ideas behind the rise and success of a conservatism that generally opposes 
policies such as ACA. See, e.g., JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE 
RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2016); KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE MAKING OF THE CONSERVATIVE 
MOVEMENT FROM THE NEW DEAL TO REAGAN (2009); DAVID MILLER, How Neoliberalism Got Where It Is: Elite Planning, 
Corporate Lobbying and the Release of the Free Market, in THE RISE AND FALL OF NEOLIBERALISM: THE COLLAPSE OF AN 
ECONOMIC ORDER? 23 (Kean Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko eds, 2010); GÉRARD DUMÉNIL & DOMINIQUE LÉVY, CAPITAL 
RESURGENT: ROOTS OF THE NEOLIBERAL REVOLUTION 11 (2004). 
100 The white working class is only part of the working class and it is not always clear what is meant by the 
term. Recent media discussions use measures such as income (making less than a certain amount such as $42,000) and/or 
education (not having a college degree) to define the working class. Use of the term white working class  may mask more 
than it illuminates. What is clear is that the group is white. See John McCullough, What does the media mean by working 
class ? Somehow they’re always white, SALON (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.salon.com/2018/11/14/what-does-the-media-
mean-by-working-class-somehow-theyre-always-white/ [https://perma.cc/G3GR-QRFR]; Susannah Snider, Where Do I 
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constitutes an emerging diverse American majority of the sort that spirited Barack Obama into the
U.S. presidency (which included some of those characterized as part of the white working class).101
But in addition to the suggestion that the Left spend its efforts cultivating the white working class,
Fukuyama fans the flames of white resentment generally. He particularly does so through his
position on political correctness, a form of identity politics that he suggests is practiced by the
Left.
D. Political Correctness and a Thought on the Supreme Court
Fukuyama explains that political correctness ( PC ) is a social norm that prohibits people
from publicly expressing their beliefs or opinions without fearing moral opprobrium. 102 He thinks
PC is especially problematic. And, there are those on the Left who agree with him. For example,
Bill Maher has suggested that PC is the elevation of sensitivity over truth, 103 and he has used, for
instance, a politically incorrect form of comedy to critique it.
While some forms of PC may hamper candid dialogue, PC arises out of the contestations
of disadvantaged peoples. It arose to encourage basic decency and civility in dialogue, as well as
knowledge-based conversations aware of the diversity of humanity and human practices some
good, others problematic. In this vein, it appropriately subjected racist, sexist, and other harmful
speech, not legally prohibited, to moral opprobrium. In doing so and here’s the rub it targeted
the felt privilege and prerogatives of the dominant and the powerful to demean others. The loss of
this felt privilege is a primary source of elites’ resentment toward PC.
The proof of PC’s origins, and of the speech it restrained, is in the pudding. Its
101 On white working class, see IDENTITY, supra note 1, at 102 04. Of course this does not have to be an
either-or proposition, though it may be an issue of resources, trying to change minds or registering people and getting out
the vote. Admittedly, however, from the perspective of electoral politics, the structure of the electoral college and current
demographics, some portion of the white working class must be part of this coalition; at least those from the democratic blue
wall states of Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, all other things remaining the same. See, e.g., Eric Bradner,
Democrats rebuilt their ‘blue wall’ in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. It’s a big deal for 2020 , CNN (Nov. 11,
2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/07/politics/democrats-rebuild-blue-wall-michigan-pennsylvania-wisconsin/
index.html [https://perma.cc/7PFF-J4XD]. However, the white working class alone was not responsible for Trump’s
election. See, e.g., PEWRESEARCHCENTER, FORMOSTTRUMP VOTERS, VERYWARM’ FEELINGS FORHIM ENDURED (Aug.
18, 2018), in full report Appendix pp. 23 4 (discussing various demographic breakdowns), http://www.people-
press.org/2018/08/09/for-most-trump-voters-very-warm-feelings-for-him-endured/ [https://perma.cc/LNY6-E6Q8]. Obama
received 39% and 43% of total white vote in 2012 and 2008 respectively. But the diverse Obama coalition also consisted of
African-Americans, Latinos, women, independents, millennials and those with a college education, of which groups, Latinos
are a growing demographic. Chris Cillizza & Jon Cohen, President Obama and the white vote? No problem, THE WASH.
POST (Nov. 8, 2012, 4:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2012/11/08/president-obama-and-the-
white-vote-no-problem/ [https://perma.cc/486P-NRJB]. But cf. Kevin Maley, What Happened to the Obama Coalition?,
VOX GLOBAL (Nov. 2016), https://voxglobal.com/intersection/2016/11/what-happened-to-the-obama-coalition/
[https://perma.cc/A6RE-FC6L]; Jonathan S. Tobin, The Fanciful Quest to Revive the Obama Coalition, NAT’L REV. (Jan.
16, 2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/democrats-2020-quest-to-revive-barack-obama-coalition/ [https://
perma.cc/3AMX-5DFY].
102 Against Identity Politics, supra note 5, at 101.
103 Matt Wilstein, Why Liberals Need Bill Maher’s Tough Love, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 22, 2018),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/bill-maher-the-only-late-night-host-willing-to-challenge-the-left [https://perma.cc/56ZL-
3FDH].
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condemnation has helped unleash people like the U.S. President to call women dogs, to refer to
other countries as shitholes, to suggest that Mexican immigrants are criminals and rapists, and to
do so without shame or consequence (and to the applause of his followers!).104 That is, the uncritical
and un-nuanced critique of PC has aided in weaponizing the First Amendment under the guise of
protecting unpopular speech. The result has been to return us to a past in which the hateful and
demeaning speech of the moneyed and powerful is privileged over the speech of the demeaned to
defend against it. And given the power dynamic here, it is unsurprising that the people who whine
the most about PC (shamed perhaps for problematic comments but rarely silenced) are the very
same ones who cry the loudest about speech with which they disagree, speech that they are quick
to label as instigating violence or as otherwise terrorist. This is especially so when disadvantaged
groups engage in speech meant to highlight the injustices they face, including, for example, such
benign assertions as black lives matter.105
But if the critique of PC has aided in weaponizing the First Amendment, privileging the
powerful over the disadvantaged culturally in terms of speech, the Supreme Court has contributed
to this process from a distributional/economic perspective. The Court has weaponized the First
Amendment,106 increasing the national power of the wealthy and corporate elites to control both
104 Philip Bump Trump’s Rationalization for Calling Women ‘Dogs’ Helped Define his Campaign, THE
WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/08/14/trumps-rationalization-for-
calling-women-dogs-helped-define-his-campaign/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c87eb94f2e86 [https://perma.cc/SN2W-
8RLJ]; Frida Ghitis, Trump’s Outrageous Remark Shows his Affinity for the Worst of America’s Past, CNN (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/11/opinions/trump-shithole-immigration-remarks-reveal-instincts-ghitis-opinion/index.html
[https://perma.cc/LL2N-E4P9]; Lisa Mascaro, Trump Complains about Allowing Immigrants from ‘Shithole’ Countries,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-congress-dreamers-20180111-story.html
[https://perma.cc/33L7-5J9V].
105 For examples of Trump’s comments or discussions about his stance on PC, see, for example, Donald
Trump on Political Correctness, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/live/republican-debate-election-
2016-cleveland/trump-on-political-correctness/ [https://perma.cc/2NR3-CFK3]; Karen Tumulty & Jenna Johnson, Why
Trump may be Winning the War on ‘Political Correctness’, THE WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/why-trump-may-be-winning-the-war-on-political-correctness/2016/01/04/
098cf832-afda-11e5-b711-1998289ffcea_story.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/ME7Z-RRD8]. For his and others’
views on Black Lives Matter see, for example, Colin Campbell, Donald Trump Blasts Black Lives Matter, BUS. INSIDER
(Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-black-lives-matter-2015-9 [https://perma.cc/3HNB-
PHMP]; Jeremy Diamond, Trump: Black Lives Matter has Helped Instigate Police Killings, CNN (July 19, 2016),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/18/politics/donald-trump-black-lives-matter/index.html [https://perma.cc/8XQP-VMFZ];
Reena Flores, White House Responds to Petition to Label Black Lives Matter a Terror Group, CBS NEWS (July 17, 2016),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/white-house-responds-to-petition-to-label-black-lives-matter-a-terror-group/ [https://
perma.cc/M5YQ-FDDV]; Leon Neyfakh, Donald Trump puts Black Lives Matter on Notice, SLATE (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/01/donald-trump-puts-black-lives-matter-on-notice.html [https://perma.cc/Q56B-
E5J5].
106 Lydia Wheeler, Kagan Accuses Supreme Court Majority of Weaponizing the First Amendment, THE HILL
(June 27, 2018), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/394402-kagan-accuses-supreme-court-majority-of-
weaponizing-the-first [https://perma.cc/PL5R-EMVZ]. See also Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133,
134-35 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s current First Amendment jurisprudence, in the context of light -touch
economic regulation, is expansively deregulatory without any limiting principle, thereby re-enshrining Lochner and
libertarian notions in law). Shanor also notes that the application of the First Amendment’s right of association in recent
labor union agency fee-share cases also exhibits some Lochnerian qualities, if defined as advancing economic
libertarianism. Boyd Garriot, Janus and the Problem with Alleging Lochnerism n.1, ON LABOR (May 4, 2018),
, 
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politics and the economy by hobbling campaign finance laws on the basis of the First 
Amendment,107 while simultaneously weakening unions by limiting their access to funding on the 
same basis.108 
But the Court has done more harm than this, in the process demonstrating the society’s 
elites’ specious commitment to democracy and the embrace of others. And it has done so in ways 
that are consistent with the elitist, sexist and racist policies of the past. It has, for instance, gutted 
the Voting Rights Act that helped ensure voting access for black and poor folks.109 It let stand a 
voting identification law that would effectively disenfranchise groups of Native Americans.110 It 
threw up its hands in contrived helplessness at partisan gerrymandering, which given the enduring 
racialized organization of US political parties smacks of racial gerrymandering.111 It allowed a white 
couple to adopt a Native American child over her father’s objections,112 a possible result for Latinx 
https://onlabor.org/janus-and-the-problem-with-alleging-lochnerism/ [https://perma.cc/Z438-E8EC]; Jedediah Purdy, The 
Roberts Court v. America: How the Roberts Supreme Court is using the First Amendment to Craft a Radical, Free-Market 
Jurisprudence, 23 DEMOCRACY 46, 46 48 (2012) (arguing, similarly, that recent Supreme Court First Amendment cases 
don’t just trim around the edges of regulation: They go to the heart of whether government can act to balance out private 
economic power in an era of growing economic inequality and insecurity,  and also implying that the Court, similar to the 
Lochner-era Court, is protecting big business under the disingenuous claim of preserving everyone’s liberty [or First 
Amendment rights] equally ). 
107 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 365 68 (2010) (holding that under the 
First Amendment political speech may not be suppressed on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity, overruling Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); that a federal statute barring independent corporate expenditures 
for electioneering communications violated the First Amendment, overruling McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); and that disclaimer and disclosure provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002 did not violate the First Amendment as applied to nonprofit corporation’s film and three advertisements for the film). 
108 Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2459 60 (2018) (holding that nonunion workers cannot be forced to 
pay fees to public sector unions). 
109 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (holding unconstitutional Section 4(b)2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, which set out the coverage formula that determined which jurisdictions, based on their histories of discrimination, 
were subject to federal preclearance of enforceable changes to their voting laws). 
110 Brakebill v. Jaegar, 139 S.Ct. 10, 10 (2018) (refusing to vacate an Eight Circuit stay that would allow 
North Dakota to enforce a voter identification statute, enacted to prevent voter fraud, that required voters to present at the 
polls a valid identification with their current residential addresses in order to vote, but which the applicants argued and the 
federal district court found disproportionally disenfranchised Native Americans in the state). Evidence suggests that 
widespread voter fraud is a myth and that many state statues enacted to prevent it are actually seeking to suppress voting 
among subordinated groups. See, e.g., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, DEBUNKING THE VOTER FRAUD MYTH (2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Briefing_Memo_Debunking_Voter_Fraud_Myth.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TXQ4-6XZY]. 
111 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). See also Eric Foner, The Supreme Court Is in Danger 
of Again Becoming ‘the Grave of Liberty, THE NATION (July 1, 2019) https://www.thenation.com/article/eric-foner-supreme-
court-john-roberts/ [https://perma.cc/E2S9-DHV5] (comparing the Rucho decision to the case of Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 
475 (1903), in which a black man sued to overturn the Alabama voting requirements that disenfranchised most blacks. The 
Court recognized the actions were unconstitutional but said it involved a political question the court could not or refused to  
remedy). 
112 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. 2552, 2553 (2013) (interpreting the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA)’s procedural safeguards as inapplicable to the involuntary termination of parental rights for an Indian child where 
the Indian parent never had custody); See also, e.g., Barbara A. Atwood, A Response to Professor Berger’s ‘In the Name of 
the Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FL. L. REV. F. 1, 1-2 (2015), 
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children whose parents have been deported pursuant to Trump’s immigration policies.113 And it 
stands poised to strip reproductive autonomy and rights from women,114 all the while proclaiming 
the promises of liberty, objectivity, and fairness. In this, it seems Fukuyama has fundamentally 
misunderstood the liberal democratic project; namely, that white elites (and large segments of white 
society despite massive economic inequality among them) are committed to democracy only in as 
much as it can guarantee white male elite rule and control over most of the country’s resources, and 
perhaps significant parts of the rest of the world’s. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Fukuyama and I are probably on the same side. We both believe that the current bout of 
white nationalism is a threat to democracy. However, Fukuyama’s argument is fundamentally 
flawed and consequently so are his recommendations. 
He correctly argues that part of the underlying motivation for the rise of nationalism is the 
ill effects of globalization which have resulted in economic anxiety and a loss of class status for 
middle- and working-class Americans. The loss of class status has been viewed by some as a threat 
to their very identities, contributing to the rise of nationalism or neofacism. But class status in places 
such as the United States has always been racialized, such that economic stress has almost always 
resulted in racial tension. 
Fukuyama’s first piece of advice then, drawn from his erroneous analysis that the Left is 
to blame for the rise of identity politics and obscuring the identity politics of the liberal state itself, 
is to recommend the silence of the racially subordinated. The subordinated are to be silent even 
though they too are suffering economic distress in this moment, while their historical recognition 
and distributional claims are ignored by sleight of hand. The effect is that the only vision left on the 
table is that of traditional nationals,  the voting majority of whom align themselves with white 
elites, deciding, it appears, that doing so is in their best social and economic interests. 
Fukuyama’s second piece of advice is reminiscent of William Julius Wilson’s argument in 
his book on the declining significance of race.115 There Wilson suggested that a focus on race 
obscured the economic problems that most Americans have in common. They both advise: Focus 
on class. The problem here is twofold. First, building coalitions around broad distributional goals 
face an uphill battle, precisely because of racial identity, history, and current practices of white 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/atwood_response.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB6W-BMQJ] (analyzing the racial, 
class, and economic biases in against unmarried parents driving the Court’s holding in Adoptive Couple). 
113 Camila Domonoske & Richard Gonzales, What We Know: Family Separation And ‘ ero Tolerance’ At 
The Border, NPR, (June 19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621065383/what-we-know-family-separation-and-zero-
tolerance-at-the-border [https://perma.cc/Q4JK-RBSM]; Meg Wagner et al., What’s happening at the US border, CNN, (June 
22, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/immigration-border-children-separation/h_86dac8f4d1616867b182116 
68c727bfd [https://perma.cc/5BC2-BWVW]. 
114 Sabrina Siddiqui & Lauren Gambino, Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation to US supreme court gives Trump 
a major victory, GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/06/brett-kavanaugh-confirmed-
us-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/W8D7-QSG7]; Adam Liptak & Noah Weiland, Justice Kavanaugh Takes the Bench 
on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/us/politics/justice-brett-
kavanaugh-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/J2AS-TEUC]. 
115 WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN 
INSTITUTIONS 109 111 (University of Chicago Press 3d ed. 2012) (1978). 
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racial alignment. Second, while many agree that capitalism increases the supply of goods and 
services and thus promotes growth (at least temporarily), they are at pains to acknowledge that it 
also tends to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few who have an interest in and increasingly the 
political power to maintain the status quo from which they benefit. This elite class, overwhelmingly 
white and male-led, buoyed by and stroking the politics of white racial resentment and alignment, 
are then in a position to stifle policies such as the ACA, meant to benefit the majority of Americans. 
If this is correct, then Fukuyama’s suggestions will reduce neither globalization-induced 
inequality and economic insecurity nor identity politics. And yet the visions and advocacy that 
might more effectively address these problems may lie in the very voices Fukuyama seeks to 
silence. 
C.L.R. James once suggested that the black struggle was a direct part of the struggle for 
socialism. 116 That is, whether one believes socialism, social democracy or some other form of 
regulated capitalism operates better economically, James thought that the black struggle sought 
widely-shared distributional justice for all, not just for some. From a different perspective but in a 
similar vein, King noted that: 
The black revolution is much more than a struggle for the rights of Negroes. It is 
forcing America to face all its interrelated flaws racism, poverty, militarism, 
and materialism. It is exposing evils that are deeply rooted in the whole structure 
of our society . . . and suggests that radical reconstruction of society itself is the 
real issue to be faced.117 
Finally, Nikhal Pal Singh, in reviewing the long civil rights struggle, notes that throughout 
the post-World War II period, blacks have been the single group in the United States whose politics 
have regularly gone beyond narrow self-interest and aimed at broad expansions of social as well as 
civil rights. 118 Black people, he argues, deepened the participatory bias and radicalized the 
intellectual connotations of democracy beyond its typical liberal  qualifications. 119 He concludes 
that it just may be that we advance equality only by continually passing through a politics of [those 
subordinated by] race and by refusing the notion of a definitive beyond’ race, 120 or, as it were, 
beyond  identity politics, especially given liberalism’s identity politics. 
All of this does not mean that the Left, deprived of substantial political power and the 
power to mobilize identity-based groups per Fukuyama’s recommendations, could not launch a 
successful political campaign; one that would yield them the power to implement both broad 
economic distribution and creedal-based programs. It simply seems unlikely that they will be 
successful in doing so. 
116 SINGH, supra note 92, at 219 (citing C. L. R. JAMES, AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1994)). 
117 Martin Luther King, Jr., The Ethical Demands for Integration, Address Before a Church Conference in 
Nashville, Tenn. (Dec. 27, 1969), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. (James M. Washington ed., 2003). 
118 SINGH, supra note 92, at 219. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 218. 
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